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Abstract: This paper proposes a new measurement for the specificity of occupations based on 
a content analysis of training curricula that we link to labor market demands. We apply 
Lazear’s (2009) skill weights approach and test predictions on labor market outcomes derived 
from his theory. We find clear evidence of a trade-off between earning higher returns with 
more specific training and higher occupational mobility with less specific training. Our 
measure improves the micro-foundation of human capital specificity and provides an 
evidence-based approach to evaluate the specificity of training curricula. 
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1. Introduction 
According to traditional human capital theory, investments in specific human capital are 
considered to be riskier than investments in general human capital, but specific investments 
are also considered to generate higher returns (Heijke & Borghans, 1998). On the one hand, 
they are considered riskier because they limit individuals’ ability to adapt to technological 
change, a view based on the assumption that individuals with specific human capital will find 
adapting to and operating new technologies, machinery and services more difficult. This 
lower adaptability might cause wage losses or unemployment (Hanushek, Schwerdt, 
Woessmann, & Zhang, 2017; Krueger & Kumar, 2004). On the other hand, investments in 
specific human capital are viewed as generating higher returns, because they are more closely 
tied to actual job requirements, thereby leading to higher productivity (Gervais, Livshits, & 
Meh, 2008; Wasmer, 2006). Thus, workers who have to decide whether to invest into more or 
less specific human capital face a trade-off between a higher return in a given job and a higher 
risk if they are forced to (or want to) change their current job. Similarly, educational policy 
makers have to decide how to design educational curricula: more or less specific to provide 
workers with different choices. In this paper, we investigate the returns and risks of 
investments in human capital by providing a new specificity measure. 
We develop a measure for the specificity of a worker’s human capital investment based on the 
skill1 bundles as specified in occupational training curricula. Previous research typically 
makes a simple dichotomy of definitions and assumes that academic (college and university) 
education provides general skills and that vocational education provides specific skills, and 
compares the labor market returns of academic and vocational education (Hanushek et al., 
2017; Korpi & Mertens, 2003; Malamud & Pop-Eleches, 2010). Several more recent studies 
indirectly measure specificity based on the wage differentials of occupational changers (e.g., 
Coenen, Heijke, & Meng, 2014) or based on the relative distribution of workers across 
occupations (Shaw, 1987; Vogtenhubler, 2014). Few studies explicitly analyze the specificity 
of human capital investments based on subject choices within study programs (e.g. Silos & 
Smith, 2015; Tchuente, 2016), but no study so far has analyzed differences in the educational 
content on the level of single skills when measuring specificity.  
                                                 
 
1 In line with the literature using a task-based approach, we define skills as “a worker’s endowment of 
capabilities for performing various tasks” (cf. Acemoglu & Autor, 2011). This definition includes practical skills 
as well as theoretical and practical knowledge. 
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Our measure relies on the identification of the bundle of single skills learned during an 
education program. Theoretically, this approach draws on Lazear’s (2009) “skill-weights 
approach,” which assumes that all single skills are general but that the combinations and 
weighting of these single skills, i.e., their uses, in different jobs make skill bundles more or 
less specific. Comparing the bundle and weights of single skills given by the curriculum of a 
training program with the required skills and weights in the overall labor market provides us 
with a specificity measure for this training program.  
Our approach is related to and extends the approach of Geel, Mure, and Backes-Gellner 
(2011) and Rinawi, Krapf, and Backes-Gellner (2014), who calculate occupational skill 
bundles and specificity measures using survey data, and data from occupational counseling 
services, respectively. While they use data on the occurrence of skills in occupations, our 
approach is to directly gather skills from occupational curricula and to additionally generate 
weights for these skills and incorporate these weights into our specificity measure. To test the 
validity of our specificity measure and its relevance for labor market outcomes and 
educational policy making, we draw on Lazear’s skill weights approach to derive and test 
hypotheses on the expected labor market outcomes of graduates of more or less specific 
training programs. In particular, we investigate the longer-term labor market outcomes of 
these graduates, i.e., their probability of changing occupations, their unemployment durations 
and their expected incomes, both, in their original occupation and after occupational changes.  
For our empirical analysis, we use Swiss vocational education and training (VET) curricula 
not only because they provide detailed data on the single skills and weights that individuals 
acquire during their training (as verified by state-mandated examinations), but also because 
these VET occupations cover more than two thirds of the Swiss labor market. This wide 
coverage allows us to calculate reliable specificity measures by comparing an occupation’s 
skill weights with those on the overall labor market. If a particular occupation requires skills 
and weights that are used only in a small number of jobs in the overall labor market, the 
occupation is defined as specific. However, if a particular occupation requires skills and 
weights that are used in a large number of jobs, it is defined as general.  
Our results show that graduates of occupations with specific skill bundles have a smaller 
probability of occupational changes and search longer for a new job when unemployed, so 
that they are less mobile than graduates of general occupations. Yet, our results also show that 
graduates of more specific occupations earn higher wages as long as they stay in the 
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occupation for which they were trained (the “training occupation”). Thus, we find clear 
evidence for a trade-off between earning higher returns in more specific occupations and 
benefitting from a higher occupational mobility in less specific occupations. The economic 
significance of these results is large, indicating that the specificity of an occupation as 
measured by our new indicator could be informative for educational and labor market policy. 
Our paper makes three scientific and one practical contribution. Our first and most important 
contribution is that we develop a new measure of occupational specificity that directly links 
the content of a training curriculum to the labor market specificity of that training. The 
measure is based on Lazear’s skill weights approach and links the bundles of single skills in a 
given curriculum with the bundles of skills existing in the labor market. Thus, we directly 
connect the content of training curricula with its specificity on the labor market. By applying 
Lazear’s framework and linking the content of training curricula to the demand in the 
respective labor market we provide a direct, curriculum-based measure of specificity and 
contribute to the empirical micro-foundation of the specificity of human capital. In contrast, 
previous literature has mainly used indirect measures of human capital specificity, such as 
measures based on worker mobility or tenure. These measures, while very helpful with 
respect to many empirical questions in labor economics, do not help to draw direct 
conclusions on the relation between the content of training curricula, their labor market 
specificity, and the respective labor market outcomes for graduates.  
Second, we show that there is substantial variation in the occupational specificity of VET 
programs and that this makes a difference for the labor market outcomes of graduates. Using 
our measure, we find that training curricula for some occupations are rather general, whereas 
others are very specific, and that some types of occupations, which have been assumed to be 
very specific in the past (for example occupations with small numbers of graduates) can 
actually be quite general.  
Third, our occupational specificity measure provides empirical support for Lazear’s skill 
weights approach because it shows a direct link between the specificity of skill bundles and 
the labor market outcomes of individuals that invested in this type of human capital. Thus, we 
provide first-hand evidence that supports Lazear’s theory by directly linking the bundles of 
single skills prescribed in training curricula to labor market outcomes of the respective 
graduates. We apply the measure to test three hypotheses derived from Lazear’s skill weights 
approach. The skill weights approach predicts that workers with specific training earn a 
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specificity premium if they stay in their training occupation, change occupations less often, 
and have longer unemployment durations. All three predictions are borne out in the data.   
Fourth, as a practical contribution, we provide a specificity measure based on curricula 
content that is shown to be closely related to real world labor market outcomes. Our 
specificity measure thus provides an evidence-based tool to evaluate the specificity of 
occupational training programs. It can help practitioners to develop or revise training 
curricula, and we briefly discuss under which conditions the measure might help curriculum 
developers to evaluate the potential outcomes of introducing new or of changing existing 
training curricula. In particular, our approach allows to measure the specificity of newly 
developed or revised training curricula before they are even implemented (which is not 
possible with specificity measures used in previous literature because they rely on historical 
labor market data). Thus, our measure provides an empirical method that contributes to the 
development of policy tools to evaluate expected outcomes of introducing new or revising 
existing training curricula. In this context, one important empirical insight of our analyses is 
that, when designing new training programs, policy makers have to be aware of a trade-off 
between higher returns of more specific trainings as long as graduates stay in their occupation 
versus higher risks of more specific trainings in case graduates need to or want to change their 
occupation. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces Lazear’s (2009) skill weights 
approach. Section 3 gives a brief overview of the regulatory aspects of the Swiss VET system. 
Section 4 explains the empirical construction of our measure for occupational specificity. 
Section 5 presents our data and dependent variables for measuring labor market outcomes. 
Section 6 explains our estimation strategy and Section 7 shows our empirical results. Section 
8 concludes. 
2. Theoretical Background: The Specificity of Occupations 
Lazear (2009) presents a theoretical approach that provides an ideal framework for our 
analysis. His skill weights approach determines human capital specificity at the level of single 
skills. Lazear’s basic assumption is that all single skills are general and transferable across 
jobs, i.e., firms or occupations, but that each job requires different skills with different 
weights attached to them. This difference in skill weights across jobs makes a worker’s skill 
bundle more or less specific. The approach assumes no a priori distinction between general 
and specific human capital. Instead, the key element of the approach is the labor market 
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demand for single skills and specificity only result from differences in skills weights in one 
job compared to the skill weights that are required in the overall labor market.  
To obtain a measure for the specificity of an occupation’s skill bundle, we have to consider 
the skill bundle in an occupation in comparison to the skill bundles in the overall labor 
market, i.e. in all other available occupations. An occupation is defined as “specific” if the 
skill weights of that occupation are very different from the skills weights in all other 
occupations. If the skill weights in an occupation are similar to those in many other 
occupations, then we define such an occupation as less specific, or “more general.” 
Occupational specificity thus depends on the distribution of occupations in the overall labor 
market.  
Using Lazear’s model of specificity allows us to derive three implications for workers’ labor 
market flexibility and wages, implications that also provide us with a test for the validity and 
accuracy of our specificity measure. First, Lazear’s model has implications for the level of 
wages in more or less specific occupations. While less specific skill bundles facilitate the 
transfer to occupations outside the individual’s occupational domain, a higher degree of 
specificity implies a higher fit of the training to the required skills in an occupation. This 
higher fit increases productivity (and thus wages2) in the given occupation.3 We therefore 
expect to find a positive correlation between occupational specificity and wages for 
occupational “stayers” (i.e., workers who never change occupations after their initial training) 
in our empirical analysis.  
Second, as a skill bundle’s specificity increases, its potential relevance in other occupations 
decreases. When an individual leaves his or her occupation, the expected return of less 
specific skill bundles in the overall labor market is higher than the return to specific skill 
bundles, because more skills can be transferred to the new occupation. We thus expect that the 
more specific the skill bundle of a training occupation, the smaller the likelihood of 
occupational mobility among workers trained in this occupation.  
Third, we expect a higher specificity to be associated with a longer search period for workers 
who become unemployed. In terms of Lazear’s model, more time allows an individual to 
                                                 
 
2 Wages increase only if the additional surplus is shared between firms and workers. Assuming that the worker’s 
bargaining position is largely determined by his options in his given occupation (options that do not depend on 
outside occupations), he or she should be able capture at least a part of the surplus. 
3 For a detailed discussion of the incentives for specialization of human capital investments in a model with two 
independent skills that are linear in utilization, see also Rosen (1983).  
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obtain more job draws on the external labor market, which increases the chance of finding 
better matching skill bundles. As the probability of finding a suitable outside option grows 
higher with more draws, workers from specific occupations can at least partly compensate for 
their initial disadvantage by searching for a longer period.4 
Before we introduce the empirical implementation of the specificity measure in Section 4, we 
present a brief description of the Swiss VET system. To illustrate why VET curricula lend 
themselves to measuring occupational skills, we briefly discuss the importance of VET in the 
overall labor market, the structure and development process of VET curricula, and the 
relevant institutions that ensure the practical implementation of the training.  
3. Institutional Background: Prevalence and Regulation of VET 
Occupations in Switzerland 
In Switzerland, VET is the predominant type of education at the secondary level. Two-thirds 
of a cohort of Swiss students attends VET after compulsory schooling. VET programs span 
between three to four years. They consist of two essential and well-defined parts that are 
combined according to official training regulations: on-the-job training while working at a 
firm and formal education at a vocational school. Each part, the firm as well as the school 
part, has detailed training curricula. Overall, VET regulations provide the training curricula 
for about 200 different occupations.5 These curricula are legally binding for all firms and 
schools.6 For each occupation, the training contents and goals are specified in detailed 
                                                 
 
4 If demand declines, workers also have the option of lowering their reservation wages to the market-clearing 
level instead of accepting unemployment. Workers with specific skill bundles face greater heterogeneity in 
valuation by potential employers than workers with general skill bundles. Lazear (2012) shows that, for these 
workers, the profit-maximizing strategy is to hold out for a better offer instead of accepting the market-clearing 
wage.  
In Switzerland, most individuals are eligible for unemployment benefits. Unemployment insurance is mandatory 
for all employees and voluntary for the self-employed. The replacement rate is 70 percent of the insured wage 
and is paid for up to two years. 
5 This number does not include the less demanding two-year programs for the same occupations (Bundesamt für 
Statistik [BFS], 2009). 
6 Apprentices spend one to two days each week at school and three to four days at their training firm. In the firm, 
a certified trainer (Berufsbildner) teaches apprentices the practical foundations of their chosen occupation. 
Apprentices acquire a predefined set of skills through a structured learning-by-doing process while actively 
participating in the firm’s production process. In the vocational schools, occupationally trained teachers give 
apprentices the necessary theoretical foundations for their occupation. In addition to these two training partners 
is often a third partner, the inter-firm learning center. These centers both teach and help apprentices practice 
occupational requirements that cannot be taught or practiced in the vocational school or training firm: These 
centers usually teach the latest occupational techniques and innovations, which some participating training firms 
might not have yet introduced (Rupietta & Backes-Gellner, 2012; Wettstein & Gonon, 2009). 
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occupational regulations approved by the federal government, i.e., the State Secretariat for 
Education, Research and Innovation (SERI).7  
Each occupational training curriculum describes the educational learning outcomes on a three-
hierarchical level of goals: first-level (competence areas), second-level (learning objectives), 
and third-level goals (operational goals) (“Leitziel—Richtziel—Leistungsziel”).8 A typical 
curriculum contains about 100 operational goals, specified within 30 pages of text.  
The (third-level) operational goals describe specific, observable actions and behavior of the 
apprentices regarding precisely defined tasks. The operational goals are the basis for the daily 
trainings that apprentices receive in the companies and at school.  From these goals, the 
trainers derive what they must teach their students and how they have to teach it, i.e. what 
activities or teaching materials they should use (Bundesamt für Berufsbildung und 
Technologie, 2007). These operational goals will later all be tested (practically and/or 
theoretically) in the final examination of an apprentice, and apprentices only pass the exam if 
they prove sufficient theoretical knowledge and practical skills in all the operational goals. It 
is therefore guaranteed that apprentices do acquire the skills that are listed in the operational 
goals and that therefore these operational goals provide a good indicator of the acquired skill 
bundles and thereby the specificity of the apprentices’ human capital. 
To construct our occupational specificity and distance measures, we use the training curricula 
for the 111 most common occupations. About 91 percent of all active workers with VET are 
trained in one of these 111 occupations, so we cover almost the entire relevant labor market of 
the workers in our sample. 
  
                                                 
 
7 These training regulations are the product of a negotiation between employer and employee representatives (the 
“professional organizations”), the Swiss federal state and the cantons. The development process is usually 
initiated by the professional organizations that recommend a new regulation or changes in existing regulations to 
the State Secretariat for Education, Research and Innovation (SERI). The SERI, after consultation with the 
appropriate professional organizations and the cantons, decides whether the regulation should be adopted. The 
cantons, in turn, issue training permits to firms and are responsible for supervising the vocational (State 
Secretariat for Education, Research and Innovation, 2014). 
8 This is called the “triplex” method of specifying occupational curricula. The SERI permits a second method, 
the “competencies-resources” method, which is applied in the health and metal-processing occupations. 
However, for our purposes, what is important is that these curricula also offer an inventory of all required skills 
similar to the hierarchical goals of the triplex method. 
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4. Measuring Occupational Specificity 
4.1. Measuring the Bundle of Single Skills in Occupations  
We gather the data on the skill bundles of occupations by performing a curriculum analysis. 
To construct our specificity measure, we need an exhaustive set of single skills in VET 
occupations. Moreover, we have to make sure that we recognize identical skills across 
occupations. In a first step, we identify single skills by using learning goals of the second 
hierarchical level. For example, a second-level learning goal for cooks is “nutrition”; it 
consists of the third level “operational” goals “nutrients,” “human metabolism,” and “human 
energy needs.” 
Table 1: Examples for learning goal hierarchies for the occupations “Cook” (Koch 
EFZ) and “Baker-Confiseur” (Bäcker-Konditor-Confiseur EFZ), abridged version 
Cook Baker 
1. Preparing Food 
1.1. Raw Materials (vegetables) 
1.1.1. Flour 
1.1.2. Fruits 
1.1.3. … 
1.2. Raw Materials (others) 
1.2.1. Meat 
1.2.2. Oils 
1.2.3. … 
1.3. Nutrition 
1.3.1. Nutrients 
1.3.2. Metabolism 
1.3.3. … 
1.4. Cooking 
1.5.… 
2. Hygiene 
3. ... 
1. Craft and technology 
1.1. Raw Materials 
1.1.1. Flour 
1.1.2. Meat 
1.1.3. … 
1.2. Nutrition 
1.2.1. Nutrients 
1.2.2. Metabolism 
1.2.3. … 
1.3. Baking 
1.4. … 
2. Business Administration 
3. Hygiene and safety 
4. … 
 
Source: Authors’ compilation, based on Swiss VET regulations. 
In the second step, we have to ensure that our list of skills is not only exhaustive but also 
exclusive. Thus, we compare all single skills across occupations and determine whether two 
skills are identical or different. In the example in Table 1, the skill “nutrition” appears in the 
curricula for both cooks and bakers (as well as some other occupations), and the third-level 
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learning goals of “nutrition” are clearly identical in both curricula. Other cases are more 
complicated but we always single out a “lowest common multiple” for all single skills.9 
With this procedure, we identify a set of 181 single skills. Although most skills find an 
equivalent in at least one, and very often multiple, other occupations, certain skills are unique 
to one occupation. In our data, such uniqueness appears in less than 20 percent of single skills. 
For example, only bakers learn how to bake, whereas (basic) cooking is also required by other 
occupations (e.g., caregivers).  
Our approach also allows us to meet an essential part of Lazear’s approach that has not been 
empirically operationalized so far: The weights of single skills in a particular occupation. As 
our single skills are derived from second-level learning goals, we approximate the weights of 
these single skills by counting the number of third-level operational learning goals and setting 
this number in relation to all operational goals in that occupation. This means that the skill 
weight of a single skill in a given occupation is defined by its share of operational goals 
compared to the overall number of operational goals in that occupation. Thus, we assume that 
the number of operational goals that is required for a single skill reflects the time and 
importance of that single skill in the respective occupation.10  
We argue that this is a good approximation for two reasons. First, operational third level goals 
are structured according to Bloom’s (1956) taxonomy. This structuring ensures that complex 
second level goals are divided in third-level sub-goals of similar complexity. Complex 
learning objectives are given more weight by more third-level operational goals, but the time 
required to achieve a third-level operational goal is relatively constant. Therefore, due to the 
curriculum development process of apprenticeship occupations in Switzerland, third-level 
                                                 
 
9 For example, cooks have two second-level goals for “raw materials”: one for “vegetables” and one for “others,” 
whereas bakers have only one goal that covers both. If there were a third occupation using only “vegetables,” we 
would have to keep both skills separate. However, as no such third occupation exists, we can collapse the two 
second-level goals for cooks (“vegetables and others”) into one single skill (“handling raw food materials”). 
10 As the length of VET-programs is standardized, increasing the weight for one skill necessarily reduces the 
weight of all other skills in the bundle. For example, as cooks have 13 out of a total of 72 operational goals 
associated with “(food) raw materials,” “raw materials” have a weight of 18 percent; and as bakers have 14 out 
of 64 goals associated with “raw materials,” the weight is 22 percent. We determine the weights for both the 
practical and the schooling parts of the training, although for the schooling part our weights are the class 
schedule and the number of lessons assigned to a certain subject. The relative weights of the schooling skills, in 
comparison to the practical skills, are determined by the percentage of time spent at school and at work. As we 
know the exact proportion of time that apprentices spend at the vocational school, we can weigh the skills 
learned at school and in practice accordingly. For example, lab assistants spend 30 percent of their time at 
school, 40 percent of which they attend chemistry lessons. Thus chemistry makes up 12 percent of their skill 
bundle. 
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goals are ensured to take about the same amount of time to be mastered. Second, third-level 
training goals are tested in the final exams of the apprenticeship programs and thus have to be 
reliably and validly gradable. This implies that these goals have to be explained with a 
comparable degree of detailedness in order to be testable with comparable precision and 
quality across the training institutions.11 
As a result, we have a full set of single skills with the respective weights for all occupations. 
In the next step, we use these weighted occupational skill bundles to construct our measure 
for the specificity of an occupation in relation to the overall labor market.  
As examples for our single skills, Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for the 15 most 
prevalent skills across all occupations. The most widely used skill is “work safety,” followed 
by “operational planning”, “environmental protection” and “mathematics”.  
  
                                                 
 
11 Of course, there will be occupations where single third-level goals need significantly more training time or 
effort than other third-level goals. These occupations introduce additional measurement errors and thus make the 
test of our hypotheses harder; if we still find statistically significant results, they provide an even stronger 
support for our hypotheses.   
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Table 2: Examples for Single Skills and Distribution of Skill weights (15 most 
prevalent skills across all occupations) 
Skill 
Required by # 
occupations 
Min  
Skill weight 
Mean  
Skill weight 
Max 
Skill weight 
     
Systematic analysis of 
work safety issues 
104 0.002 0.066 0.183 
Operational planning 97 0.005 0.043 0.204 
Environmental protection 93 0.002 0.042 0.143 
Mathematics 75 0.002 0.029 0.095 
Quality assurance 70 0.002 0.032 0.176 
Machinery maintenance 
and repair 
68 0.001 0.028 0.094 
Systematic documentation 
of products and processes 
66 0.004 0.022 0.095 
Sales techniques 63 0.002 0.071 0.325 
Manual manufacturing 63 0.001 0.082 0.340 
Data administration 61 0.000 0.038 0.374 
Office/User software 55 0.003 0.030 0.174 
Technical drawing 54 0.004 0.069 0.240 
Logistics 54 0.002 0.034 0.446 
Technical documentation 54 0.003 0.032 0.139 
Physical principles 51 0.002 0.023 0.052 
     
The table shows descriptive statistics for the most prevalent skills, based on their 
incidence. The mean values are weighted by the size of occupations. 
 
On average, an occupation uses 21.4 single skills. The minimum number is of skills used by 
an occupation is 8 and the maximum is 38. The average skill weight over all occupations is 
0.047. 
4.2. Occupational Specificity  
With this skill data at hand, we operationalize Lazear’s skill weights approach and calculate 
our occupational specificity measure. Formally, a specific occupation is one that has skill 
weights that are far away from all other occupations and jobs and at the extreme, having no 
overlaps with other occupations at all. In line with previous literature (e.g. Nawakitphaitoon, 
2014; Robinson, 2011), we call the degree of overlap between two skill bundles the “skill 
distance” between them. The average distance of an occupation’s skill bundles to all other 
skill bundles thus measures the specificity of an occupation. To implement the measure 
empirically, we proceed in two steps. In the first step we calculate a measure for the skill 
distance between all occupational skill bundles. In the second step, we combine this 
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information with labor market data to calculate an average distance measure for each 
occupation.  
The distance measure we calculate in the first step captures the overlap of the skill bundles of 
two occupations, thus indicating the extent to which skills can be used after an occupational 
change between these two occupations. We use the angular distance measure as introduced to 
the skill literature by Gathmann and Schönberg (2010).12 We calculate the distance between 
all 6,105 possible pairs13 of occupational skill vectors according to the following formula: 
𝐴𝑛𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑟𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑂𝑃 =
∑ 𝑥𝑂𝑖 ∗ 𝑥𝑃𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
√∑ 𝑥𝑂𝑖2
𝑛
𝑖=1 ∗ ∑ 𝑥𝑃𝑖
2𝑛
𝑖=1
 
O and P denote two occupations, and xOi is the skill weight of skill i in occupation O. We 
assume that VET workers hold a skill bundle according to the skill weights of their training 
occupation. Each skill weight in the original occupation is multiplied by the corresponding 
weight in the new occupation and then added up. If a skill is used extensively in both 
occupations, the product—and thus the overlap in the skill use in the new occupation—is 
high. If a skill has a high weight in the worker’s original occupation but not in the new one, 
the degree of transferability from the old to the new occupation is low.14 The denominator 
normalizes the results such that the sum always lies between zero and one.15 
                                                 
 
12 The angular distance is used in a similar context by Fedorets (2011) and Bublitz (2013). Alternative 
approaches to measuring the transferability of human capital include measures based on the Euclidian distance 
(e.g., Robinson, 2011) or factor score changes (e.g., Poletaev and Robinson, 2008).  
Compared to alternative distance measures, the angular distance has several advantages for our application. As 
we have more than 180 skill dimensions, many of our skill vectors are highly diversified. If two occupations are 
highly diversified, the vector endpoints would lie close to the origin of the coordinate system. Thus the vectors 
will be “close” by the Euclidian measure, even if they are completely orthogonal and use no identical skills at all. 
The angular distance is purely directional and thus insensitive to the length of a vector. 
13 (𝑛 =
111∗(111−1)
2
= 6105). 
14 There is a growing body of literature examining the transferability of skills between occupations and showing 
that differences in tasks between occupations can explain the wage changes of individuals switching occupations 
(e.g. Fedorets, 2011; Gathmann & Schönberg, 2010; Nawakitphaitoon & Ormiston, 2016; Nedelkoska, 2010; 
Poletaev & Robinson, 2008; Robinson, 2011). Our approach is closely related to and builds on this literature. 
The literature on skill transferability examines how the similarity in skills between jobs affects wage changes in 
a particular employment relationship; in Appendix A, we examine whether our skill data can replicate some of 
the main results of the transferability literature. However, the transferability literature does not measure the 
specificity of skill bundles with regard to the entire labor market, i.e., if a particular skill bundle offers more or 
fewer employment opportunities. 
15 As the angular distance captures similarity rather than distance, we reverse the measure such that a higher 
number corresponds to a larger distance and less skill overlap, i.e., we define: Skill distance = 1 – angular 
distance.  
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The closest occupational change we observe in our data is from a vegetable grower to a fruit 
grower, with a very small distance of 0.033. These two occupations have almost the same 
skill bundles and weights. The most distant change we observe is from a mechanical 
technician (Produktionsmechaniker) to a commercial employee (Kaufmann), with a distance 
of 0.999. The most frequent change we observe in the data is from a commercial employee to 
a retailer with a distance of 0.447. The closest and most distant changes of selected 
occupations appear in Table 3.16  
Table 3: Distance between selected occupations 
Change from … 
Change to …  
closest and most distant occupation 
Distance measure 
   
Commercial employee Retail employee 0.447 
 Mechanical technician 0.999 
   
Plumber Tinsmith 0.184 
 Commercial employee 0.985 
   
Graphic designer Multimedia designer 0.149 
 Cabinetmaker 0.945 
   
Health care worker Social care worker 0.136 
 Gardener 0.986 
   
Electronics technician Automatician 0.409 
 Commercial employee 0.964 
   
Florist Gardener 0.559 
 Mechanical engineer 0.993 
   
Food technologist  Miller 0.177 
 Commercial employee 0.972 
   
Metal worker Panel beater 0.347 
 Farmer 0.800 
   
Laboratory assistant  Chemical and pharmaceutical tech.  0.485 
 Social care worker 0.966 
   
We report only changes that occurred at least once. Occupations are selected to give an 
impression of various sectors and branches. Source: Authors’ calculations, based on skill 
data from Swiss training regulations and the Social Protection and Labour Market Survey 
(SESAM), 1999-2009. 
 
In a second step, we combine the information on the distance between any two occupations 
with representative labor market data for all workers with a VET education. To represent the 
                                                 
 
16 A full list of all occupational distances is available from the authors upon request. 
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distribution of the skill bundles in the overall labor market, we use the number of jobs in all 
111 occupations.  
In detail, we construct the specificity measure by calculating a weighted average distance 
from any one occupation to all other occupations in the labor market. The weights are the 
relative employment shares of occupations. We thus incorporate the potential demand for a 
particular occupational skill bundle in our occupational specificity measure. The specificity 
measure is mathematically equivalent to the expected average distance that workers have to 
bridge if they are forced to leave their occupation and randomly accept the next available job. 
A rather general skill bundle exhibits a small difference between its own skill weights and the 
outside market weights. To account for changes in the labor market demand for skills during 
the period, we calculate the specificity measure for each year (1999 - 2009) separately. 
The most specific training occupation is paper technologist (Papiertechnologe); the least 
specific training occupation is hotel management clerk (Hotelfachmann). We show the 
specificity measure of all occupations in Table B1 in the Appendix. 
The distribution of jobs in the labor market is a key factor in the skill weights approach. 
Importantly, the specificity of an occupation does not depend on its own size, i.e. the number 
of jobs in this occupation. Rather, it depends on the relative size of occupations in the outside 
labor market. Thus, the specificity of occupations is relatively stable over the observation 
period, although some occupations experienced quite a dramatic decline or increase in the 
employment shares. Figure 1 shows the relationship of average occupational size and 
specificity for our sample occupations. Small occupations can be very unspecific, e.g., if they 
are positioned in a sizable skill cluster with many similar occupations. Empirically we 
observe that the correlation between the size of an occupation and our specificity measure is 
only 0.02. 
In the next step, we apply our specificity measure to test the hypotheses derived from Lazear 
on the expected labor market outcomes of different occupations.  
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Figure 1: Occupational Specificity and Occupational Size 
 
   
The figure shows a scatterplot of occupational specificity and size (employment share of all 
VET workers in percent) for each occupation. 
5. Data 
We test our hypotheses using the Social Protection and Labour Market (SESAM) survey 
provided by the Swiss Federal Statistical Office.  
5.1. The SESAM Labor Market Data  
The SESAM combines the Swiss Labour Force Survey (SLFS) with several social insurance 
registers. The survey, conducted yearly by the Statistical Office, comprises a representative 
sample of the Swiss population over the age of 15 with about 50,000 randomly selected 
interviews per year. The SESAM provides rich information on employment status, education 
histories, and socio-demographics. It has a rolling panel structure, following individuals for 
up to five years. We use data from 1999 to 2009. The panel structure allows us to identify an 
individual’s occupational change by comparing his or her occupation codes in two 
consecutive years. We can check whether an individual has completed (upper secondary) 
VET and whether he or she is still working in the original training occupation. Additionally, 
we have information on firm tenure and administrative wage data for each job. 
To identify occupational changes, we use the Swiss Standard Classification of Occupations 
(SBN2000) provided in the SESAM. We consider changes at the most disaggregate level of 
occupations (the 5-digit level), because at this level we can precisely match the occupations 
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with our VET programs.17 For each individual, we compare the 5-digit occupation for each 
pair of consecutive years t0 and t1.
18 We assume that workers who have graduated before our 
observation period hold a skill bundle that roughly corresponds to the skill bundle as specified 
in the latest legal training curriculum, i.e., we assume that workers will have updated their 
skill bundle according to the most recent requirements while working on the job. 
Nevertheless, in Section 7.4 we perform robustness checks restricting the sample to workers 
who have graduated no earlier than 1999.19  
5.2. Sample and Descriptive Statistics 
Our sample includes individuals with a VET diploma between the ages of 18 and the 
mandatory retirement age (64 for women and 65 for men). Individuals must have worked at 
least once during the observation period. We include all individuals who have completed a 
training program in one of the 111 certified VET occupations for which we have skill data.20 
We exclude individuals who have acquired additional formal qualifications (i.e., higher 
professional qualifications, vocational baccalaureate, and university degree). This restriction 
ensures that we have a homogeneous sample of individuals with a uniform level of education.  
After eliminating observations with missing data, we have a sample of 16,175 individuals (or 
62,977 single observations) trained in one of the 111 training occupations for which we have 
skill data. As mentioned earlier, these 111 occupations cover about 91 percent of all VET-
trained individuals in the data. In total, we observe 2,209 individuals who performed an 
occupational change during the sample period.  
For the wage analysis, we use the register-based wage data from the SESAM. As part-time 
employment is very common in Switzerland (33.6 percent of all workers work less than 90 
percent), we include part-time workers and calculate full-time equivalent wages for their 
                                                 
 
17 In some rare cases, corresponding three- and four-year apprenticeships are pooled in the same 5-digit 
occupation, e.g. we cannot distinguish between Automobil-Fachmann EFZ and Automobil-Mechatroniker EFZ. 
However, the skill bundles of these occupations are mostly identical except that the four-year programs include 
some additional topics.  
18 We also perform our estimations with occupational changes defined on the 3-digit level; more information is 
presented in the robustness checks in section 7.4. 
19 VET occupations are regularly revised. In this process, occupations are sometimes assigned a new name and 
SBN code. In such cases, using a SERI-provided database on the evolution of VET occupations (Grebasch, 
2013), we merge the two codes. We do not consider an individual’s changing from an old to a new code as an 
occupational change. In other words, we assume that the individual updated his or her knowledge with on-the-
job practice. In case of revisions, we always analyze the most up-to-date training regulation that came into force 
before 2009.  
20 As the share of self-employed workers varies greatly between occupations, we include self-employed workers. 
However, we include a dummy variable for self-employment in our estimations. 
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primary job.21 We adjust the wages for inflation (base year 2004). Table 4 presents descriptive 
statistics for the full sample of individuals.  
Table 4: Descriptive statistics - Full sample 
Variable N Mean St. Dev. Min Max 
Individual characteristics 
     Age 16,175 40.476 11.372 18 64 
Firm tenure 16,175 9.599 9.298 0 47.4 
Male 16,175 0.523 0.499 0 1 
Married 16,175 0.552 0.497 0 1 
Swiss 16,175 0.692 0.462 0 1 
 
     
Labor market status      
Fulltime 16,175 0.705 0.456 0 1 
Wage 16,175 5,590.953 2,281.793 450  19,850 
Size of occupation (in % of total 
VET labor market) 16,175 0.087 0.103 0.001 0.277 
Self-employed 16,175 0.1339 0.3405 0 1 
Top management position 16,175 0.1247 0.3304 0 1 
Management position 16,175 0.1969 0.3977 0 1 
      
Explanatory variable 
     Occupational specificity measure 16,175 0.847 0.062 0.669 0.971 
      
Note: We report all variables when an individual first enters the sample. 
  
Individuals are on average 40 years old and have been working for the same firm for 9.6 
years. The average observation period per individual is 3.3 years. About 52 percent of the 
sample is male, and 55 percent are married. A two-sided t-test shows that males work in more 
specific occupations than females. About 70 percent are Swiss nationals.22 The average gross 
wage (earned income) is 5,587 Swiss Francs (approx. US$ 6,942) per month.  
Our data also allows us to observe self-reported data on unemployment spells and their 
duration in days. For the unemployment duration analysis, we include all VET workers who 
report being unemployed during our observation period (or in the year preceding the first 
                                                 
 
21 To increase the plausibility of our analysis, we drop observations with wages belonging to the highest or 
lowest 0.5 percent. If the individual was not working in the same firm for the entire month before the annual 
survey, we set the wage to missing (n=74), because the wage in this month will most likely be too low.  
22 Of the non-Swiss nationals, a large proportion (nearly 60%) has completed their secondary education in 
Switzerland. Of the remaining workers, approximately 50% are immigrants from Germany and Austria, which 
are countries that have VET systems and training curricula that are very similar to the Swiss. We performed our 
main estimations for both sub-samples and find very similar results for both populations. 
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survey interview).23 In total we observe 1,201 valid unemployment spells that fulfill this 
criterion. Figure 2 shows the distribution of these spells. 
Figure 2: Unemployment Duration 
 
   
The figure plots the distribution of the unemployment spell durations of workers who got 
unemployed during the observation period (1999-2009). 
 
6. Empirical Estimation 
Corresponding to our three hypotheses, we examine the correlation of our specificity measure 
and the labor market outcomes of graduates in three separate estimations: In the first 
estimation, we test the effect of specificity on wage levels of occupational stayers and 
changers, in the second on occupational mobility, and in the third on unemployment 
durations. 
 
                                                 
 
23 Give a certain degree of measurement error we delete spells that are inconsistent over consecutive years. 
Additionally, as longer spells have a higher probability of being reported, short spells are likely to be 
underrepresented. We expect that both issues can induce only a downwards bias in our estimates.  
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6.1. Occupational Specificity and Wages  
Lazear’s model predicts higher wages for workers who have invested in specific occupational 
skill bundles, at least as long as they stay in the occupation and use these specialized skills. 
We estimate an OLS Mincer-type earnings function to test for a correlation between 
occupational specificity and wages. We include a dummy variable for observations of workers 
who are still working in their original training occupation, and interact this dummy variable 
with the specificity of the worker’s training occupation (model 1).  
log(𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒) =  𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑂 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑦𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑦𝑖𝑋𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑂 + 𝛽4𝑆𝑂𝑖𝑂
+ 𝛽5𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽6𝑠𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽7𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑑𝑖 + 𝛽8𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽9𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖
2 + 𝛽10𝑈𝑅𝑖  
+ 𝛽11𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽12𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖
2 + 𝛽13self­employed𝑖 + 𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖
+ 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 + 𝜑𝑡 + 𝜔𝑖 + 𝜀 
The variable “specificityiO” denotes the specificity of individual i who was originally trained 
in occupation O.24 We control for the size of an occupation in our regression analysis. The 
variable “size of occupation” (SO) measures how many people are working in a given 
occupation in a year, i.e. its employment share. Large occupations offer more job 
opportunities, which could influence a worker’s outside offers and bargaining power.  
We include a comprehensive set of individual characteristics (gender, age, nationality, marital 
status, and self-employment), all of which influence individual’s wage levels and the 
probability of occupational changes (Bleakley & Lin, 2012; Eymann & Schweri, 2011; 
Fitzenberger & Kunze, 2005; Shaw, 1987).  
Additionally, we control for several job-related characteristics. We include tenure with the 
current firm as a proxy for additional firm-specific human capital.25 We also include dummies 
for firm size because employees from large firms earn a firm-size wage premium (e.g. 
Lallemand, Plasman, & Rycx, 2007) and change occupations less often, at least shortly after 
                                                 
 
24 We also estimated all our models with a squared term for the specificity measure and do not find any 
significant non-linear effects. 
25 The recent literature explores the importance of industry-specific tenure for wage determination (Kambourov 
& Manovskii, 2009; Sullivan, 2010). Unfortunately, we cannot contribute to this discussion because we lack 
information about the industry in which workers have completed their training. It is also not feasible to 
reconstruct this information from the training occupation as such, because a large proportion of individuals is 
trained in occupations that may be acquired in a variety of different industries (e.g., commercial employees, the 
largest occupational group in Switzerland, may receive training in a variety of different industries such as 
banking, retail, transportation, chemistry, and many more). Thus, we cannot measure or reconstruct original 
industries or industry changes. 
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the completion of the training (e.g., Bougheas & Georgellis, 2004; Winkelmann, 1996). If 
small firms are active mainly in specialized occupations, our results could be biased.  
A potential concern might be that occupational codes could change with the hierarchical 
position within a firm. In addition to tenure, we include a dummy for top managers and one 
for middle managers (workers with personnel responsibilities). Furthermore, 𝜔𝑖 and 𝜑𝑡 
denote region (cantons) and year fixed effects, respectively, and the regional (cantonal) 
unemployment rate (UR) controls for local labor market conditions. 
6.2. Occupational Specificity and Occupational Mobility  
For graduates of occupations with a highly specific skill bundle, we expect a lower rate of 
occupational mobility. To test our hypothesis, we use a probit model and maximum likelihood 
estimation (Wooldridge, 2002). Our explanatory variables are (model 2): 
Pr(𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 = 1|𝒙)
= Φ(𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑂 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑂𝑖𝑂 + 𝛽3𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑠𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽5𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑑𝑖
+ 𝛽6𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽7𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖
2 + 𝛽8𝑈𝑅𝑖𝑡  + 𝛽9𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽10𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖
2
+ 𝛽11self­employed𝑖 + 𝛽12 log(𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒)𝑖 + 𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖  
+ 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 + 𝜑𝑡 + 𝜔𝑖) 
The dependent variable is one if the worker changed occupations during the observation 
period and zero otherwise. We expect a negative association of our main variable of interest, 
skill specificity, and the occupational mobility of workers. We estimate two specifications.  
In the base specification, we include the control variables from model 1, namely occupational 
size, age, age squared, gender, nationality, marital status, tenure, tenure squared, self-
employed, hierarchical position, firm size, local (cantonal) unemployment rates, as well as 
year and region dummies.  
In a second specification, we add a control for the worker’s wage before the change. Higher 
wages are generally associated with lower occupational mobility (e.g. Parrado, Caner, & 
Wolff, 2007). As the specificity of occupations might affect the occupational changing 
behavior of workers through an effect on their earnings, this second specification should be 
considered only as robustness test (reduced form effect). If job characteristics, particularly 
wages, are determined by differences in the specificity of occupations, these characteristics 
could capture a part of the specificity effect.  
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6.3. Occupational Specificity and Unemployment Duration  
As an alternative indicator for workers’ labor market flexibility, we investigate the effect of 
occupational specificity on unemployment durations. Given our theoretical model, we 
hypothesize that workers from specific occupations, after becoming unemployed, need more 
time to find new employment. To test this hypothesis, we estimate a Cox proportional hazard 
model of the following type, taking into account the right censoring of our data (model 3): 
ℎ𝑖(𝜏) = ℎ0(𝜏) ∙ exp (𝛽1𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑂 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑂𝑖𝑂 + 𝑋
′𝛽) 
This model describes exit to work after τ days of unemployment for an individual who entered 
unemployment at time τ=0 and who has received training in an occupation with a given 
specificity. The control variables include age, age squared, gender, nationality, marital status, 
region, year, and the local unemployment rate. All control variables are evaluated in the year 
the workers first enter unemployment. A negative value of β1 implies a decrease of the hazard 
rate and thus a longer unemployment duration for individuals with more specific training. 
7. Results and Robustness Checks 
7.1. Occupational Specificity and Wages 
We present the estimation results for the effect of specificity on workers’ average wage level 
(model 1) in Table 5. The coefficient of the interaction term between “in training occupation” 
and “specificity” is positive and significant at the one percent level. This significant 
interaction is in line with our hypothesis that trained individuals who stay in a specific 
occupation receive a wage premium. The baseline coefficient of the specificity measure for 
the changers is positive and marginally significant. This finding indicates that changers with 
highly specific training are generally not punished for completing training in a high-
specificity occupation after changing their occupation. It does, however, appear that these 
changers lose the specificity premium they had in their original occupations. Note that this 
result holds for the sample of all observed occupational changes (be they voluntary or 
involuntary) and thus, β1 and β3 do not necessarily identify a causal wage effect of specificity. 
As workers usually switch to “close” occupations (Gathmann & Schönberg, 2010; Geel & 
Backes-Gellner, 2011), part of this effect is also likely due to workers from highly specific 
occupations switching to occupations still requiring relatively specific skill bundles. 
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Table 5: Occupational Specificity and Wages, OLS (model 1) 
 Coefficient SE 
 
 
 Specificity (std.) 0.0191* (0.0099) 
In training occupation (1=yes) 0.0193 (0.0223) 
In training occ. X Specificity 0.0333*** (0.0116) 
Size of occupation (std.) 0.0717*** (0.0067) 
Age 0.0389*** (0.0033) 
Age squared -0.0004*** (0.0000) 
Male 0.1861*** (0.0173) 
Swiss 0.0666*** (0.0088) 
Married 0.0160 (0.0115) 
Self-employed -0.2908*** (0.0350) 
Fulltime work -0.0021 (0.0136) 
Firm tenure 0.0094*** (0.0007) 
Firm tenure squared -0.0001*** (0.0000) 
Local unemployment rate -0.0096 (0.0071) 
Constant 7.2898*** (0.0877) 
   
Year and region dummies included  
Firm size dummies included  
Managerial position dummies included  
   
F-statistics 702.3  
R^2 0.2588  
N 62,977  
   
Table reports coefficients of an OLS regression; dependent variable: (log) wages; robust 
standard errors in parentheses (clustered by training occupation), * (**,***) denotes 
statistical significance at the 10% (5%,1%) level.  
 
Staying in the original training occupation is rewarded only in specific occupations; at the 
mean level of specificity, staying is not positively associated with higher wages. While this 
finding may appear surprising, it is in line with the literature reporting very heterogeneous 
effects for changing out of the learned VET occupation, depending on the sample used and 
the definition of occupational changes (see Göggel & Zwick, 2012; Müller & Schweri, 2015).  
As for the control variables, occupational size has a highly significant and positive coefficient. 
Larger training occupations pay higher wages. However, this effect might be driven by a few 
large occupations and disappears when we control for the intellectual demand level of 
occupations in Section 7.4 (Robustness checks).   
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7.2. Occupational Specificity and Occupational Mobility 
We show the results for our hypothesis on the effect of occupational specificity on 
occupational mobility (model 2) in Table 6. The estimated coefficient for the occupational 
specificity measure has the expected negative sign and is statistically significant at the one 
percent level. Individuals from occupations with more specific skill bundles exhibit 
significantly less occupational mobility.26 Learning a specific occupation thus seems to tie 
workers more strongly to their occupation. 
  
                                                 
 
26 This in line with empirical results of Rinawi et al. (2014), who also use SESAM wage data but use ratings of 
career centers to construct a specificity measure. 
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Table 6: Occupational mobility, probit regressions (model 2) 
 Coef. dy/dx Coef. dy/dx 
 
   
 Specificity (standardized) 
 
-0.0861*** -0.0174*** -0.0799*** -0.0161*** 
(0.0242)  (0.0232)  
Size of occupation 
 
-0.0962*** -0.0194*** -0.0812*** -0.0163*** 
(0.0220)  (0.0240)  
Age 
 
-0.0097 -0.0020 -0.0029 -0.0006 
(0.0095)  (0.0100)  
Age squared 
 
0.0001 0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 
(0.0001)  (0.0001)  
Male 
 
0.1365* 0.0275* 0.1664** 0.0334** 
(0.0757)  (0.0769)  
Swiss 
 
0.0065 0.0013 0.0170 0.0034 
(0.0460)  (0.0463)  
Married 
 
-0.0608** -0.0123** -0.0578** -0.0116** 
(0.0259)  (0.0258)  
Self-employed -0.1105 -0.0223 -0.1581** -0.0317** 
 (0.0692)  (0.0696)  
Local unemployment rate 
 
-0.0300 -0.0060 -0.0324 -0.0065 
(0.0405)  (0.0404)  
Firm tenure 
 
-0.0391*** -0.0079*** -0.0375*** -0.0075*** 
(0.0057)  (0.0058)  
Firm tenure squared 
 
0.0008*** 0.0002*** 0.0007*** 0.0001*** 
(0.0001)  (0.0001)  
Fulltime employment 
 
-0.0141 -0.0028 -0.0108 -0.0022 
(0.0347)  (0.0342)  
Ln (wage before change) 
 
  -0.1803*** -0.0362*** 
  (0.0422)  
     
Firm size dummies included  included  
Managerial position dummies included  included  
Year and region dummies included  included  
     
Pseudo R^2 0.063  0.066  
N 16,175  16,175  
  
  
 
Table reports marginal effects at the means; robust standard errors in parentheses 
(clustered by training occupation), * (**,***) denotes statistical significance at the 10% 
(5%,1%) level. 
 
An increase in the specificity index of one standard deviation decreases the probability of 
belonging to the group of occupational changers during the observation period by about 1.7 
percentage point. While the effect may appear relatively small, it should be put in perspective 
to the average changing rate during the observation period, which is about 13.6 percent. 
The control variables are in line with our expectations. The size of an occupation has a highly 
significant negative influence on the probability of changing. Workers in small occupations 
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switch occupations more often. Small occupations that cover a niche in the labor market are 
obviously not an obstacle to labor mobility. This finding is in line with Lazear’s model, as 
workers in occupations with a large number of jobs are expected to have more appropriate job 
options within the same occupation.  
When introducing the job-specific controls in specification 2, the estimated specificity 
coefficient is only slightly smaller. Tenure with the last firm has a highly significant and 
decreasing negative effect, suggesting that the loss of firm-specific human capital might also 
be an important factor for changing occupations. In contrast, when we control for tenure, age 
has no significant effect on the probability of belonging to the group of changers, likely due to 
the high multicollinearity of both variables. Finally, the results show that workers with higher 
wages are significantly more likely to stay in the same occupation than those with lower 
wages. 
7.3. Occupational Specificity and Unemployment Duration 
Table 7 presents the estimated effects of occupational specificity on unemployment 
durations.27 Specification 2 additionally includes time and region fixed effects. According to 
Lazear’s model, individuals with specific training need more draws from the distribution of 
skill combinations if they are to find suitable new options. Since more draws require more 
time, we expect workers with more specific training to take more time to find new 
employment.  
  
                                                 
 
27 An analysis of the Schönfeld residuals (Grambsch & Therneau, 1994) shows no evidence that the proportional 
hazard assumption might be violated (not reported). 
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Table 7: Unemployment duration (model 3) 
 Hazard Ratios 
 Spec. (1) Spec. (2) 
 
  
Specificity (standardized) 
 
0.9416*** 0.9221*** 
(0.0193) (0.0203) 
Size of occupation (standardized) 
 
0.9886 0.9924 
(0.0214) (0.0265) 
Age 
 
0.9873 0.9787 
(0.0187) (0.0196) 
Age squared 
 
0.9999 1.0001 
(0.0002) (0.0003) 
Male 
 
0.9382 0.9078 
(0.0876) (0.0808) 
Swiss 
 
1.1298* 0.9877 
(0.0821) (0.0810) 
Married 
 
0.9746 1.0133 
(0.0876) (0.0881) 
Local unemployment rate 
 
0.8581*** 1.0375 
(0.0241) (0.1298) 
   
Year and region dummies Not included Included 
   
Log-likelihood -3813 -3753 
Number of spells 1,201 1,201 
   
Table presents the results of the unemployment duration regression model as hazard ratios 
based on the Cox estimator. Total number of spells = 1,201, total number of failures =649. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered by training occupation)28; * (**, ***) 
denotes statistical significance at the 10% (5%, 1%) level.  
 
Corroborating our previous results, a one standard deviation higher occupational specificity 
reduces the hazard of finding a job (in a worker’s original occupation or any other occupation) 
by about 6 to 8 percent, compared to an individual with otherwise identical covariates.  
7.4. Robustness Checks 
To test the robustness of our results, this section addresses three potential issues of our 
estimation approach. First, we narrow down the sample to young workers only, because one 
could argue that their skill bundle most closely corresponds to the skill bundle specified in the 
latest training curricula. Second, we consider a broader definition of occupational changes, 
                                                 
 
28 We include workers with more than one unemployment spell. As clustering the standard errors on the 
individual level decreases the standard errors, we report the more conservative estimates and cluster on the 
occupational level.  
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namely on the 3-digit instead of the 5-digit level. Third, we address the issue of unobserved 
heterogeneity with two additional tests. 
Our first robustness check concerns our assumption that workers who earned their degree long 
before our observation period may not have the same skill bundles as recent graduates. In the 
previous estimations, we assumed that these workers have upgraded their skill bundle while 
working on the job, and thus hold a skill bundle that corresponds to the skill bundle specified 
in the most recent legal training curricula. However, to address the concern of outdated skill 
bundles we repeat our analysis and restrict the sample only to workers who graduated during 
our observation period (1999-2009) because they are most likely to have graduated under the 
most recent generation of curricula.  
We report the results for our main estimations in Tables B2 - B4. Although the sample size is 
greatly reduced, the size of the effect is in general robust, and the significance of the results 
does not drop substantially. The estimated effects of specificity are higher for occupational 
changes (model 2) and unemployment durations (model 3) and slightly less pronounced for 
the wage estimation (model 1). But overall, the results are very stable and all hypotheses are 
born out in the data. 
In our second robustness check, we consider an alternative definition of occupational changes. 
One could argue that changes in occupational codes at the 5-digit level might involve career 
advancements within the same group of occupation (e.g. from “commercial employee” to 
“accountant”), which may lead to different results than a change from one group of 
occupation to another group of occupation (e.g. from “commercial employee” to “IT 
specialist”). Since we talk about career changes, we therefore perform the estimations using 
only changes on the 3-digit occupational classification to see whether our results are robust. 
However, as can be seen in Tables B5 and B6 in the Appendix, the results do not change 
much when using this alternative specification.29  
A third concern is that some of the variation measured across training programs could be due 
to workers’ selection into programs based on ability, risk preferences or other unobservables. 
Although we focus on a relatively homogenous group of workers and it seems likely that the 
heterogeneity in that sample is already small, there could still be sorting according to ability 
                                                 
 
29 Please note that we still match the specificity on the 5-digit level. The results of model 3 do not change, as the 
model does not look at occupational changes. 
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or risk preferences within that group. Although we cannot fully rule this out, we argue that 
there are at least four reasons to believe that these problems are not the only drivers of our 
results.  
First, regarding problems due to ability sorting, we can empirically look into how 
intellectually demanding the different occupational training programs, into which the 
individuals would sort themselves, are. To address the problem, we use an existing measure 
on how “intellectually demanding” different occupational programs in Switzerland are. It is a 
6-point scale measure that was developed by Stalder (2011) and is based on an evaluation by 
career counselors of the intellectual requirements of all occupations. Unfortunately, the 
measure is available only for 89 of our 111 occupations, thus reducing our sample, but for the 
remaining, i.e., all quantitatively important occupations, the correlation between the “ability 
requirements measure” and our specificity measure is very low (0.069). Therefore, we 
conclude that it seems rather implausible that high ability individuals systematically self-
select or are sorted into occupations with high specificity because these occupations are 
particularly demanding. When we control for “intellectual demand requirements” in our 
empirical estimations, it does not weaken the relationship between our specificity measure 
and the outcome variable in any of our models (Tables B7-B9). This finding is inconsistent 
with an assumption that our results are mainly driven by differences in intellectual demand. 
Therefore, it seems unlikely that ability sorting is the sole driver of our main results; instead it 
seems reasonable to assume that the differences in the specificity of the occupational training 
programs can explain at least a part of the different labor market outcomes.  
Second, regarding the problem that risk-oriented individuals sort into different occupations, 
we argue that such an assumption is not fully consistent with our empirical results. If we 
would assume that risk-oriented individuals often choose specific occupations (and that this 
willingness to take risks is compensated with higher wages), this could explain our wage 
results. However, it could still not explain why more risk-oriented workers would change 
occupations less often and particularly why they would have longer unemployment durations. 
But we do observe that workers with specific occupations change less often and have longer 
unemployment durations. Thus, we argue that risk preferences alone cannot explain our 
results.  
Third, regarding the problem of selection into occupations in principal, previous empirical 
studies have shown that teenagers who choose an apprenticeship at the age of fifteen have a 
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strong preference for those occupations that are regionally available (Oswald & Backes-
Gellner, 2014), which substantially restricts their spectrum for self-selection. 
Fourth, a potential means to control for at least time-invariant unobserved labor market 
characteristics (e.g. time-invariant selection of students into occupations) is to exploit the time 
variation of the occupational specificity within occupations only. Unfortunately, our data is 
not well suited for such an analysis because our observation period is relatively short and the 
variation of the specificity of occupations over the observation period is very small compared 
to the variation between occupations, which makes identifying significant effects unlikely. 
Nevertheless, we repeat all the main estimations with training occupations fixed effects. As 
expected, the overall significance of the coefficients on the main variables of interest are 
somewhat reduced, but we still find significant effects in all three models and they are in 
accordance with our previous interpretations. We show the results of these estimations in 
Tables B10 - B12 in the Appendix. 
Thus, although we cannot completely rule out that there is endogenous sorting, it seems 
plausible that this is not the only explanation for the empirical patterns that we observe. In any 
case, even if the effects are not purely causal, we still believe that the pattern we observe are 
interesting and deserve the attention of educational policy makers, because they show how 
specificity is distributed, and to what extent and with what consequences workers are able to 
change their occupations. 
8. Conclusions  
We analyze the curricula of VET and, drawing on Lazear’s (2009) “skill weights” approach, 
calculate specificity measures for training occupations. By comparing the skill bundles of 
VET occupations to the average skill distribution in the labor market, we examine the extent 
to which VET occupations include skills that are required across a wide range of occupations, 
and thus capture the specificity of an occupation.  
We provide three main findings. First, we show that small occupations with a limited supply 
of jobs are not necessarily specific and that large occupations with many jobs are not 
necessarily more general. We thus argue that the number of jobs in an occupation or the 
number of different occupations in a VET system per se is not what is relevant for the 
flexibility of workers. Instead, what matters are the overlap and weights of skill bundles 
across occupations.  
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Second, we find that workers who stay in their training occupation benefit from training that 
is more specifically tailored to one occupation and receive higher wages on average. 
Additionally, we do not find evidence that, of all changers (be they voluntary or involuntary), 
those with more specific skill bundles have significantly lower wages after changing their 
occupation. Instead, our results indicate that, on average, workers who change from highly 
specific occupations do not have lower wages than other changers, but they do lose their 
specificity premium. However, we cannot distinguish between voluntary and involuntary 
changers and do not know to what extent this result is driven by, for example, self-selection.  
Third, we find that specificity has implications for a worker’s labor market flexibility. The 
higher the specificity of an occupation, the smaller the probability that workers change their 
occupation. If individuals from highly specific occupations change their occupation, they lose 
the wage premium of that highly specific occupation and have thus higher wage losses than 
workers from general occupations who never had such premium. Additionally, workers with 
more specific training need more time to find employment again after becoming unemployed.  
Our approach to evaluate the specificity of training curricula is not limited to Switzerland and 
does not exclusively apply to countries with vocational education and training systems; 
instead, it is rather generalizable. This approach could be used to evaluate curricula of all 
educational programs that strive to prepare students with labor market-oriented skills. 
Conversely, it is unlikely to be important for kindergarten and may be less important for 
primary and lower secondary education because a direct connection to labor market skills is 
less important for these programs.  
Our approach can thus guide decision makers whenever the specificity of a training program 
is to be evaluated, even if that program is new. The implementation requires two steps. First, 
sufficiently detailed information on the skills supplied by the training program need to be 
collected (which, as we have shown, can be elicited directly from the training curricula 
themselves). Second, information on skill requirements in the relevant labor market needs to 
be collected. As we show, this information may be gathered by aggregating and weighting the 
information on the skills of all training curricula in a given market. This information could 
also be relevant for prospective students choosing among vocational degrees or designing 
their own curriculum. 
For large-scale curriculum changes, one would need to consider general equilibrium effects. If 
the same skill is changed (added or dropped) in many curricula at the same time, the 
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distribution of skill bundles in the overall labor market changes as well, and the net effect of 
these changes may be different from the one that is expected from small and isolated changes, 
and based on a partial equilibrium analysis. However, as our empirical approach cannot model 
general equilibrium effects, our findings are restricted to incremental changes in curricula 
(which are, in reality, the most frequent changes). Further research could thus examine this 
issue by investigating historical large-scale changes and by using longer time spans.  
A lot of research still has to be done, before one can draw final conclusions for educational 
policy making from our empirical results. However, we provide novel results that lay 
important foundations for new policy conclusions on the design of training curricula. So far, 
there was only very limited empirical knowledge on occupational specificity that could be 
directly related to the content of training curricula. This feature is however very important for 
policy makers, who have to decide on new or revising old occupational curricula and, who, by 
taking these decisions induce important and long-term labor market outcomes. Our study is a 
first piece of empirical evidence to close this gap and to indicate which types of curricula 
changes will more likely result in higher or lower mobility and higher or lower wages for 
stayers or movers. 
To better address the problem of unobserved heterogeneity, future research could try to 
exploit time variation with longer panel data sets. By constructing a panel of occupational 
skill content over a much longer time, future research could examine what happens if 
occupations become more or less specific over time (e.g. due to curricula changes) and could 
use this variation to identify the effects controlling for unobserved occupational and 
individual heterogeneity. Future research could also try to model student’s occupational 
choice, for example by using pre-training measures and employing a selection model to 
control for potential endogenous sorting. 
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9. Appendix 
9.1. Appendix A: Occupational Distance 
According to Lazear’s idea of skill-bundle-specific human capital, a worker’s wage after an 
occupational change should depend on the distance between the worker’s skill weights (the 
skill weights of the training occupation) and the required skill weights in the target 
occupation. To test the theoretical predictions of Lazear’s model and to show that our skill 
bundles have predictive power for post-switching wages, we estimate the following model 
(similar to the specification of Nedelkoska, 2010) using OLS estimations (model 4): 
𝑤𝑖,𝑂2,𝑡+1 − ?̅?𝑂2 = 𝛽 ∗ 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑂1−𝑂2 + 𝛾 ∗ 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛿 ∗ 𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙. 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑡 + 𝜑𝑡 + 𝜔𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑂,𝑡 
The dependent variable is the deviation of the individual’s wage after the change (𝑤𝑂2,𝑡+1) 
from the average starting wage in the target occupation (?̅?𝑂2). We calculate the starting wage 
in an occupation by taking the average first-year wage of individuals who change their firm 
but not their occupation. The main explanatory variable is the skill distance measure between 
the worker’s origin occupation O1 and the target occupation O2 (𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑂1−𝑂2). 
If a worker is equipped with the optimal skill bundle for the new occupation, he or she should 
earn a wage close to the average first-year wage of workers who change firms, but not 
occupations. If the worker performs a distant switch and can thus use only a small part of his 
or her skill-specific human capital, he or she should earn a significantly lower starting salary. 
We use a standard set of control variables (𝑋𝑖,𝑡) including age, age squared, tenure (in the 
previous job), tenure squared, nationality and marital status, as well as region (𝜔𝑖) and year 
(𝜑𝑡) dummies. 
Here, we focus on the subsample of changers. Because we expect the immediate wage change 
to be the best indicator for the skill-mismatch, we focus on monthly wages in the first year 
after the change. For inclusion in analysis, workers must thus be employed in the year before 
and immediately after the change.30 After applying our sample restrictions, the subsample for 
which we have wage data reduces to 1,316 individual cases.31 
                                                 
 
30 If an individual changes his or her occupation two or more times during the five-year observation period, we 
analyze only the wage effect of the first change to avoid cases where individuals hold jobs only temporarily.  
31 This number is lower than the number of changers reported in section 5.2, because we now additionally 
require valid wage data in the year after the change (not only before the change).  
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Table A1: Occupational Distance and Post-Switching Wages, OLS (model 4) 
 Coefficient SE 
 
 
 Distance (standardized) -0.0227* (0.0131) 
Age 0.0225** (0.0098) 
Age squared -0.0003** (0.0001) 
Male 0.1964*** (0.0277) 
Swiss 0.0452 (0.0292) 
Married -0.0224 (0.0290) 
Firm tenure 0.0206*** (0.0048) 
Firm tenure squared -0.0004** (0.0002) 
Constant -0.5544*** (0.1805) 
   
Year and region dummies included  
   
F-statistics 4.458  
R^2 0.1042  
N 1,316  
   
Table reports coefficients of an OLS regression; dependent variable: deviation from mean 
(log) entry wage after change; (robust) standard errors in parentheses, * (**,***) denotes 
statistical significance at the 10% (5%,1%) level.  
 
Table A1 reports the results for model 4. Our distance measure has predictive power in 
explaining human capital loss for workers changing occupations. The estimated coefficient of 
the distance measure is significantly negative at the ten percent level. A high distance leads to 
a skill-specific human capital mismatch and a lower starting wage at the new job after the 
change. This result is in line with Lazear’s skill weights approach of human capital and 
confirms that our distance measure is a valid input for the construction of our specificity 
measure.32 A one standard deviation larger distance between occupation of origin and target 
occupation reduces the proportion of the individual’s wage to the average entry wage by 
about two percent.  
  
                                                 
 
32 Our result is also in line with previous research on occupational mobility using a task-based approach. Recent 
empirical studies examining the dissimilarity between occupations and the consequences for wage changes 
include for example: Geel and Backes-Gellner (2011); Nedelkoska (2010); Poletaev and Robinson (2008); 
Rinawi et al. (2014); Wiederhold, Nedelkoska, and Neffke (2013); Nawakitphaitoon (2014); Gathmann and 
Schönberg (2010). 
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9.2. Appendix B: Additional Tables 
Table B1: Specificity measures (all occupations) 
Occupation (German) Occupation (English) Specificity 
   
Papiertechnologe EFZ Paper Technologist 0.971 
Uhrmacher Rhabillage Watchmaker 0.945 
Zahntechniker EFZ Dental Technician 0.941 
Innendekorateur Polster Interior Decorator 0.940 
Bekleidungsgestalter EFZ Clothes Designer 0.938 
Milchtechnologe EFZ Dairy Technician 0.938 
Podologe EFZ Podiatrist 0.936 
Maler EFZ Painter 0.934 
Fachmann Gesundheit EFZ Healthcare Worker 0.930 
Strassenbauer EFZ Road Builder 0.926 
Gärtner EFZ Gardener 0.923 
Elektroniker EFZ Electronics Engineer 0.921 
Fachmann Betreuung EFZ Social Care Worker 0.918 
Textilpfleger EFZ Textile Worker 0.917 
Oberflächenbeschichter EFZ Electroplater 0.916 
Automobil-Mechatroniker EFZ Automotive technician 0.915 
Produktionsmechaniker EFZ Mechanical Technician 0.914 
Landmaschinenmechaniker EFZ Agricultural Machinery Mechanic 0.914 
Feinwerkoptiker EFZ Precision Optician 0.913 
Informatiker EFZ IT Specialist 0.913 
Motorradmechaniker EFZ Motorcycle Mechanic  0.911 
Ofenbauer EFZ Stove Builder 0.907 
Graveur EFZ Engraver 0.905 
Gleisbauer EFZ Track Worker 0.905 
Fotograf EFZ Photography Expert 0.904 
Konstrukteur EFZ Design Engineer 0.903 
Isolierspengler EFZ Insulation Installer 0.902 
Automatiker EFZ Automation Engineer 0.902 
Gebäudereiniger EFZ Building Cleaner 0.900 
Zeichner EFZ (Hochbau) Draughtsman (Architecture) 0.897 
Kaminfeger EFZ Chimney Sweeper 0.896 
Gusstechnologe EFZ Casting Technologist 0.895 
Grafiker EFZ Graphic Designer 0.895 
Gipser Plasterer 0.894 
Forstwart EFZ Forester 0.893 
Kosmetiker EFZ Beautician 0.891 
Tierpfleger EFZ Animal Caretaker 0.890 
Polygraf EFZ Desktop Publisher 0.888 
Polymechaniker EFZ Mechanical Engineer 0.888 
Printmedienverarbeiter EFZ Print Media Processor 0.884 
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Table B1: continued  
Occupation (German, continued) Occupation (English, continued) Specificity 
   
Orthopädist EFZ Orthopedic Technician 0.878 
Netzelektriker EFZ Powerline Technician 0.876 
Geomatiker EFZ Surveyor 0.874 
Müller EFZ (LM) Miller 0.873 
Multimediagestalter Multimedia Designer 0.873 
Kunststofftechnologe EFZ Plastics technologist 0.873 
Zimmermann EFZ Carpenter 0.873 
Heizungsinstallateur EFZ Installer for Heating Systems 0.873 
Elektroplaner EFZ Electrical Designer 0.869 
Schmied-Hufschmied Blacksmith 0.869 
Sanitärinstallateur EFZ Plumber 0.868 
Weintechnologe EFZ Wine Technologist 0.867 
Florist EFZ Florist 0.866 
Glasmaler EFZ Glass Painter 0.866 
Formenbauer Florist 0.866 
Anlagenführer EFZ Plant Operator 0.866 
Tiermedizinischer Praxisassistent EFZ Veterinary Nurse 0.866 
Betonwerker EFZ Concrete Craftsman 0.864 
Info- und Dokumentationsassistent Information and Documentation Expert 0.863 
Strassentransportfachmann EFZ Road Builder 0.863 
Medizinischer Praxisassistent EFZ Medical Assistant 0.863 
Gebäudetechnikplaner Building Services Planner 0.862 
Coiffeur EFZ Hairdresser 0.862 
Anlagen- und Apparatebauer EFZ Plant and Equipment Manufacturer 0.862 
Maurer EFZ Bricklayer 0.862 
Polybauer EFZ (Dachdecken) Building Constructor 0.861 
Goldschmied EFZ Goldsmith 0.861 
Fachmann Hauswirtschaft EFZ Domestic Worker 0.859 
Musikinstrumentenbauer EFZ Musical Instrument Maker 0.859 
Boden-Parkettleger EFZ  Floor Layer 0.858 
Lebensmitteltechnologe EFZ Food Technologist 0.858 
Elektroinstallateur EFZ Electrician 0.857 
Logistiker EFZ Logistician 0.853 
Bäcker-Konditor-Confiseur EFZ Baker-Confectioner 0.852 
Landwirt EFZ Farmer 0.851 
Spengler EFZ Tinsmith 0.848 
Schreiner EFZ  Cabinetmaker 0.846 
Laborant EFZ  Laboratory Assistant 0.845 
Koch EFZ Specialist in Professional Kitchen 0.841 
Drucktechnologe EFZ  Printing Technologist 0.839 
Dentalassistent EFZ Dental Assistant 0.838 
Kaufmann EFZ Commercial Employee 0.837 
Chemie- und Pharmatechnologe EFZ Chemical and Pharmaceutical Technologist 0.833 
Multimediaelektroniker EFZ Multimedia Electronics Technician 0.831 
Winzer EFZ Grape Grower 0.829 
Glaser EFZ Glazier 0.826 
Gemüsegärtner EFZ Vegetable Grower 0.822 
Schuhmacher EFZ Shoemaker 0.817 
Mikrozeichner EFZ Micro Designer 0.816 
Fleischfachmann EFZ Butcher 0.809 
Bahnbetriebsdisponent Railway Operations Manager 0.804 
Steinbildhauer EFZ Stonesculptor 0.801 
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Table B1: continued  
Occupation (German, continued) Occupation (English, continued) Specificity 
   
Obstfachmann EFZ Fruit Farmer 0.801 
Steinmetz EFZ Stonemason 0.799 
Metallbaukonstrukteur EFZ Metal Construction Engineer 0.795 
Holzhandwerker EFZ Woodworker 0.795 
Fotofachmann EFZ (Finish/Verkauf) Photography Expert 0.794 
Metallbauer EFZ Metal Worker 0.792 
Fachmann Kundendialog EFZ Customer Dialogue Specialist 0.790 
Carrossier Lackiererei EFZ Body Painter 0.789 
Carrossier Spenglerei EFZ Panel Beater 0.765 
Drogist EFZ Druggist 0.762 
Keramiker EFZ Ceramist 0.759 
Pharma-Assistent EFZ Pharmaceutical Assistant 0.746 
Textiltechnologe EFZ (Design) Textile Technologist 0.745 
Detailhandelsfachmann EFZ Retail Clerk 0.737 
Augenoptiker EFZ Optician 0.730 
Polydesigner EFZ (Realisation) Polydesigner 0.727 
Buchhändler EFZ Bookseller 0.699 
Restaurationsfachmann EFZ Specialist in Restaurant Service 0.683 
Hotelfachmann EFZ Hotel Management Clerk 0.669 
   
The reports the specificity measure for each training occupation, averaged over the years 
1999-2009. Source: Authors’ calculations, based on the SESAM 1999-2009 and skill data 
from Swiss trainings regulations.  
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Table B2: Occupational Specificity and Wages, OLS (model 1), young workers only 
(graduation year ≥ 1999) 
 Coef. 
 
 
Specificity (std.) 
 
0.0108 
(0.0075) 
In training occupation (1=yes) 0.0053 
 (0.0138) 
In training occ. X Specificity 0.0204* 
 (0.0104) 
Size of occupation (std.) 
 
0.0205 
(0.0221) 
Local unemployment rate 
 
-0.0250 
(0.0167) 
Constant 
 
6.8593*** 
(0.1290) 
  
Individual and job controls (age, age2, gender, nationality, marital 
status, tenure, tenure2, fulltime work, self-employment) included 
Year and region dummies included 
Firm size dummies included 
Managerial position dummies included 
  
F-statistics 441.4 
R^2 0.2890 
N 9,375 
 
 
Table reports coefficients of an OLS regression; dependent variable: (log) wage; robust 
standard errors in parentheses (clustered by training occupation), * (**,***) denotes 
statistical significance at the 10% (5%,1%) level.  
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Table B3: Occupational mobility, probit regressions (model 2), young workers only 
(graduation year ≥ 1999)  
 Coef. dy/dx Coef. dy/dx 
 
   
 Specificity (standardized) 
 
-0.0865** -0.0206** -0.0841** -0.0201** 
(0.0359)  (0.0352)  
Size of occupation 
 
-0.1157*** -0.0276*** -0.1094*** -0.0261*** 
(0.0262)  (0.0256)  
Age 
 
-0.0382* -0.0091* -0.0311 -0.0074 
(0.0231)  (0.0244)  
Age squared 
 
0.0004 0.0001 0.0003 0.0001 
(0.0003)  (0.0003)  
Male 
 
0.1974*** 0.0471*** 0.2095*** 0.0499*** 
(0.0724)  (0.0733)  
Swiss 
 
-0.0416 -0.0099 -0.0426 -0.0102 
(0.0706)  (0.0706)  
Married 
 
-0.1011 -0.0241 -0.1038 -0.0247 
(0.0995)  (0.0997)  
Self-employed -0.0027 -0.0006 -0.0169 -0.0040 
 (0.1510)  (0.1553)  
Local unemployment rate 
 
0.0898 0.0214 0.0874 0.0209 
(0.1589)  (0.1590)  
Firm tenure 
 
-0.0308* -0.0073* -0.0293* -0.0070* 
(0.0166)  (0.0168)  
Firm tenure squared 
 
0.0008* 0.0002* 0.0007 0.0002 
(0.0005)  (0.0004)  
Fulltime employment 
 
-0.1565 -0.0373 -0.1531 -0.0365 
(0.1207)  (0.1195)  
Ln (wage before change) 
 
  -0.1144 -0.0273 
  (0.1022)  
     
Firm size dummies included  included  
Managerial position dummies included  included  
Year and region dummies included  included  
     
Pseudo R^2 0.088  0.088  
N 1,832  1,832  
  
  
 
Table reports marginal effects at the means; robust standard errors in parentheses 
(clustered by training occupation), * (**,***) denotes statistical significance at the 10% 
(5%,1%) level.  
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Table B4: Unemployment duration, proportional hazards model (model 3), young 
workers only (graduation year ≥ 1999) 
 Hazard Ratios 
 Spec. (1) Spec. (2) 
 
  
Specificity (standardized) 
 
0.8622* 0.7601*** 
(0.0737) (0.0801) 
Size of occupation (standardized) 
 
0.7746*** 0.7403* 
(0.0645) (0.1162) 
Age 
 
0.9726 0.9862 
(0.0702) (0.1213) 
Age squared 
 
0.9997 0.9996 
(0.0011) (0.0018) 
Male 
 
1.0711 1.2565 
(0.2104) (0.2829) 
Swiss 
 
1.6439** 1.5088 
(0.3244) (0.3787) 
Married 
 
1.1027 1.3638 
(0.3125) (0.4245) 
Local unemployment rate 
 
0.8818* 0.8556 
(0.0665) (0.3406) 
   
Year and region dummies Not included Included 
   
Log-likelihood -695.3 -660.9 
Number of spells 286 286 
   
Table presents the results of the unemployment duration regression model as hazard ratios 
based on the Cox estimator. Total number of spells = 286, total number of failures = 160. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered by training occupation); * (**,***) 
denotes statistical significance at the 10% (5%,1%) level.  
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Table B5: Occupational Specificity and Wages, OLS (model 1), 3-digit level 
 Coefficient SE 
 
 
 Specificity (std.) 0.0187* (0.0102) 
In training occupation (1=yes) 0.0234 (0.0217) 
In training occ. X Specificity 0.0311*** (0.0109) 
Size of occupation (std.) 0.0711*** (0.0066) 
Age 0.0391*** (0.0032) 
Age squared -0.0004*** (0.0000) 
Male 0.1857*** (0.0172) 
Swiss 0.0666*** (0.0088) 
Married 0.0160 (0.0114) 
Self-employed -0.1436*** (0.0316) 
Fulltime work -0.0022 (0.0136) 
Firm tenure 0.0093*** (0.0007) 
Firm tenure squared -0.0001*** (0.0000) 
Local unemployment rate -0.0096 (0.0072) 
Constant 7.1370*** (0.0967) 
   
Year and region dummies included  
Firm size dummies included  
Managerial position dummies included  
   
F-statistics 719.9  
R^2 0.2589  
N 62,977  
   
Table reports coefficients of an OLS regression; dependent variable: (log) wages; robust 
standard errors in parentheses (clustered by training occupation), * (**,***) denotes 
statistical significance at the 10% (5%,1%) level.  
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Table B6: Occupational mobility, probit regressions (model 2), 3-digit level 
 Coef. dy/dx Coef. dy/dx 
 
   
 Specificity (standardized) 
 
-0.0571** -0.0108** -0.0501** -0.0094** 
(0.0258)  (0.0248)  
Size of occupation 
 
-0.0824*** -0.0156*** -0.0660*** -0.0124** 
(0.0231)  (0.0252)  
Age 
 
-0.0154 -0.0029 -0.0078 -0.0015 
(0.0106)  (0.0112)  
Age squared 
 
0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 
(0.0001)  (0.0001)  
Male 
 
0.1333 0.0252 0.1657** 0.0312** 
(0.0834)  (0.0841)  
Swiss 
 
0.0096 0.0018 0.0207 0.0039 
(0.0459)  (0.0461)  
Married 
 
-0.0720*** -0.0136*** -0.0691** -0.0130** 
(0.0273)  (0.0272)  
Self-employed -0.1352* -0.0256** -0.1890*** -0.0355*** 
 (0.0701)  (0.0709)  
Local unemployment rate 
 
-0.0121 -0.0023 -0.0148 -0.0028 
(0.0445)  (0.0447)  
Firm tenure 
 
-0.0376*** -0.0071*** -0.0358*** -0.0067*** 
(0.0052)  (0.0053)  
Firm tenure squared 
 
0.0007*** 0.0001*** 0.0007*** 0.0001*** 
(0.0001)  (0.0001)  
Fulltime employment 
 
-0.0452 -0.0085 -0.0415 -0.0078 
(0.0373)  (0.0367)  
Ln (wage before change) 
 
  -0.1984*** -0.0373*** 
  (0.0433)  
     
Firm size dummies included  included  
Managerial position dummies included  included  
Year and region dummies included  included  
     
Pseudo R^2 0.063  0.065  
N 16,175  16,175  
  
  
 
Table reports marginal effects at the means; robust standard errors in parentheses 
(clustered by training occupation), * (**,***) denotes statistical significance at the 10% 
(5%,1%) level. 
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Table B7: Occupational Specificity and Wages, OLS (model 1), Intellectual demand 
 Coefficient SE 
 
 
 Specificity (std.) 0.0094 (0.0072) 
In training occupation (1=yes) 0.0203 (0.0220) 
In training occ. X Specificity 0.0377*** (0.0117) 
Size of Occupation (std.) 0.0115 (0.0178) 
Age 0.0386*** (0.0034) 
Age squared -0.0004*** (0.0000) 
Male 0.1833*** (0.0160) 
Swiss 0.0586*** (0.0074) 
Fulltime work 0.0203 (0.0123) 
Married -0.0010 (0.0143) 
Firm tenure 0.0095*** (0.0007) 
Firm tenure squared -0.0001*** (0.0000) 
Local unemployment rate -0.0098 (0.0072) 
Constant 6.9258*** (0.0901) 
   
Year and region dummies included  
Firm size dummies included  
Hierarchical position dummies included  
Intellectual demand level (Stalder, 2011) included  
   
F-statistics 1792.0  
R^2 0.2669  
N 61,867  
   
Table reports coefficients of an OLS regression; dependent variable: (log) wage; robust 
standard errors in parentheses (clustered by training occupation), * (**,***) denotes 
statistical significance at the 10% (5%,1%) level.  
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Table B8: Occupational mobility, probit regressions (model 2), Intellectual demand 
 Coef. dy/dx Coef. dy/dx 
 
   
 Specificity (standardized) 
 
-0.0848*** -0.0168*** -0.0808*** -0.0160*** 
(0.0200)  (0.0189)  
Size of Occupation 
 
-0.1780*** -0.0354*** -0.1798*** -0.0356*** 
(0.0544)  (0.0503)  
Age 
 
-0.0107 -0.0021 -0.0033 -0.0006 
(0.0097)  (0.0101)  
Age squared 
 
0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
(0.0001)  (0.0001)  
Male 
 
0.1275* 0.0253* 0.1595** 0.0315** 
(0.0690)  (0.0693)  
Swiss 
 
0.0036 0.0007 0.0127 0.0025 
(0.0469)  (0.0471)  
Married 
 
-0.0503* -0.0100* -0.0460* -0.0091 
(0.0279)  (0.0279)  
Self-employed 
 
-0.1049* -0.0208* -0.1536** -0.0304** 
(0.0626)  (0.0639)  
Local unemployment rate 
 
-0.0201 -0.0040 -0.0221 -0.0044 
(0.0406)  (0.0407)  
Firm tenure 
 
-0.0388*** -0.0077*** -0.0373*** -0.0074*** 
(0.0058)  (0.0059)  
Firm tenure squared 
 
0.0008*** 0.0001*** 0.0007*** 0.0001*** 
(0.0001)  (0.0001)  
Fulltime employment 
 
-0.0320 -0.0064 -0.0301 -0.0060 
(0.0340)  (0.0342)  
Ln (wage before change) 
 
  -0.1968*** -0.0389*** 
  (0.0399)  
     
Firm size dummies included  included  
Hierarchical position dummies included  included  
Year and region dummies included  included  
Intellectual demand level (Stalder, 
2011) included  included  
     
Pseudo R^2 0.065  0.068  
N 15,747  15,747  
  
  
 
Table reports marginal effects at the means; robust standard errors in parentheses 
(clustered by training occupation), * (**,***) denotes statistical significance at the 10% 
(5%,1%) level.  
 
 
 
  
44 
 
 
Table B9: Unemployment duration, proportional hazards model (model 3), 
Intellectual demand 
 Hazard Ratios 
 Spec. (1) Spec. (2) 
 
  
Specificity (standardized) 
 
0.9500 0.9291** 
(0.0308) (0.0296) 
Size of occupation (standardized) 
 
1.2459* 1.1841* 
(0.1457) (0.1108) 
Age 
 
0.9826 0.9766 
(0.0189) (0.0202) 
Age squared 
 
1.0000 1.0001 
(0.0002) (0.0003) 
Male 
 
0.9626 0.9181 
(0.0929) (0.0851) 
Swiss 
 
1.1116 0.9733 
(0.0814) (0.0825) 
Married 
 
1.0050 1.0459 
(0.0891) (0.0891) 
Local unemployment rate 
 
0.8552*** 1.0423 
(0.0237) (0.1337) 
   
Year and region dummies Not included Included 
Intellectual demand level (Stalder, 2011) Included Included 
   
Log-likelihood -3729 -3670 
Number of spells 1180 1180 
   
Table presents the results of the unemployment duration regression model as hazard ratios 
based on the Cox estimator. Total number of spells = 1’180, total number of failures = 637. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered by training occupation); * (**,***) 
denotes statistical significance at the 10% (5%,1%) level.  
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Table B10: Occupational Specificity and Wages, OLS (model 1 with occupation FE) 
 Coefficient SE 
 
 
 Specificity (std.) 0.0753** (0.0350) 
Stayer (1=yes) 0.0146 (0.0242) 
Stayer X Specificity 0.0307*** (0.0115) 
Size of occupation (std.) -0.0218 (0.0152) 
Age 0.0380*** (0.0036) 
Age squared -0.0004*** (0.0000) 
Male 0.1843*** (0.0069) 
Swiss 0.0601*** (0.0068) 
Married 0.0199 (0.0123) 
Self-employed -0.1275*** (0.0233) 
Fulltime work 0.0052 (0.0122) 
Firm tenure 0.0095*** (0.0006) 
Firm tenure squared -0.0001*** (0.0000) 
Local unemployment rate -0.0090 (0.0075) 
Constant 6.8936*** (0.1052) 
   
Occupation dummies included  
Year and region dummies included  
Firm size dummies included  
Managerial position dummies included  
   
R^2 0.2826  
N 62,977  
   Table reports coefficients of an OLS regression; dependent variable: (log) wages; robust 
standard errors in parentheses (clustered by training occupation), * (**,***) denotes 
statistical significance at the 10% (5%,1%) level.  
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Table B11: Occupational mobility, linear probability model (equivalent to model 2 
with occupation FE) 
 Coef. Coef. 
 
  
Specificity (standardized) 
 
-0.0650* -0.0622* 
(0.0344) (0.0344) 
Size of occupation 
 
-0.0561*** -0.0564*** 
(0.0215) (0.0215) 
Age 
 
0.0022** 0.0032*** 
(0.0011) (0.0011) 
Age squared 
 
-0.0000* -0.0000** 
(0.0000) (0.0000) 
Male 
 
0.0234*** 0.0282*** 
(0.0051) (0.0052) 
Swiss 
 
-0.0046 -0.0031 
(0.0036) (0.0036) 
Married 
 
-0.0074** -0.0068** 
(0.0032) (0.0032) 
Self-employed 0.0096* 0.0060 
 (0.0058) (0.0059) 
Local unemployment rate 
 
-0.0191*** -0.0190*** 
(0.0042) (0.0042) 
Firm tenure 
 
-0.0169*** -0.0166*** 
(0.0005) (0.0005) 
Firm tenure squared 
 
0.0004*** 0.0004*** 
(0.0000) (0.0000) 
Fulltime employment 
 
-0.0002 -0.0004 
(0.0052) (0.0052) 
Ln (wage before change) 
 
 -0.0258*** 
 (0.0040) 
   
Occupation dummies included included 
Firm size dummies included included 
Managerial position dummies included included 
Year and region dummies included included 
   
R^2 0.051 0.052 
N 43,795 43,795 
  
 
Table reports the coefficients of a linear probability model; robust standard errors in 
parentheses (clustered by training occupation), * (**,***) denotes statistical significance 
at the 10% (5%,1%) level. In contrast to the main estimations, we have used each annual 
observation of an individual as an independent observation to use as much of the year-to-
year variation as possible. The number of observations is lower than in model 1, because 
we focus on occupational changes during the observation period and thus cannot use an 
individual’s first observation. Due to the well-known incidental parameter problem in non-
linear models with fixed effects (Wooldridge, 2002), we present the coefficients of a linear 
probability model.  
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Table B12: Unemployment duration (model 3 with occupation FE) 
 Hazard Ratios 
 Spec. (1) Spec. (2) 
 
  
Specificity (standardized) 
 
0.1146*** 0.2306 
(0.0682) (0.2362) 
Size of occupation (standardized) 
 
8.2679*** 2.8276** 
(1.9295) (1.4712) 
Age 
 
0.9958 0.9926 
(0.0235) (0.0259) 
Age squared 
 
0.9998 0.9998 
(0.0003) (0.0003) 
Male 
 
0.8891 0.8052* 
(0.1349) (0.1028) 
Swiss 
 
1.1371 0.9732 
(0.0967) (0.1029) 
Married 
 
0.9858 0.9983 
(0.1176) (0.1103) 
Local unemployment rate 
 
0.8491*** 0.8804 
(0.0255) (0.1066) 
   
Occupation dummies Included Included 
Year and region dummies Not included Included 
   
Log-likelihood -3762 -3703 
Number of spells 1,201 1,201 
   Table presents the results of the unemployment duration regression model as hazard ratios 
based on the Cox estimator. Total number of spells = 1,201, total number of failures = 649. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered by training occupation); * (**,***) 
denotes statistical significance at the 10% (5%,1%) level.  
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